The Lovász extension of a pseudo-Boolean function f : {0, 1} n → R is defined on each simplex of the standard triangulation of [0, 1] n as the unique affine functionf : [0, 1] n → R that interpolates f at the n + 1 vertices of the simplex. Its degree is that of the unique multilinear polynomial that expresses f . In this paper we investigate the least squares approximation problem of an arbitrary Lovász extensionf by Lovász extensions of (at most) a specified degree. We derive explicit expressions of these approximations. The corresponding approximation problem for pseudoBoolean functions was investigated by Hammer and Holzman [14] and then solved explicitly by Grabisch, Marichal, and Roubens [11], giving rise to an alternative definition of Banzhaf interaction index. Similarly we introduce a new interaction index from approximations off and we present some of its properties. It turns out that its corresponding power index identifies with the power index introduced by Grabisch and Labreuche [10] .
Introduction and problem setting
Real valued set functions are extensively used in both cooperative game theory and multicriteria decision making (see for instance [11] and the references therein). Indeed, in its characteristic form, a cooperative game on a finite set of players N := {1, . . . , n}, is a set function v : 2 N → R such that v(∅) = 0 which assigns to each coalition S of players a real number v(S) representing the worth of S. In multicriteria decision making, when N represents a set of criteria, a capacity (also called non-additive measure) on N is a monotone set function v : 2 N → R such that v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1 which assigns to each subset S of criteria its weight v(S).
There is a natural identification of real valued set functions v : 2 N → R with pseudo-Boolean functions f : {0, 1}
n → R through the equality v(S) = f (1 S ), where 1 S denotes the characteristic vector of S in {0, 1}
n (whose ith component is 1 if and only if i ∈ S). Moreover, it is known [15] that any pseudoBoolean function f : {0, 1}
n → R has a unique expression as a multilinear polynomial in n variables
where the set function a : 2 N → R is simply the Möbius transform (see for instance [21] ) of v, which can be calculated through
Let S n denote the family of all permutations σ on N. The Lovász extension f : [0, 1] n → R of any pseudo-Boolean function f is defined on each n-simplex
as the unique affine function which interpolates f at the n + 1 vertices of S σ (see Lovász [17, §3] and Singer [24, §2] ).
The concept of Lovász extension was initially used in combinatorial optimization [8, 17, 24] and then in cooperative game theory [2, 11] . In this paper we are mostly concerned by the interpretation of this concept in decision making, where it was observed in [18] that the Lovász extension of a monotone pseudo-Boolean function is nothing but a discrete Choquet integral [4, 5] . Recall that discrete Choquet integrals were recently proposed in decision making as aggregation functions that generalize the weighted arithmetic means by the taking into consideration of the interaction phenomena among input variables; see for instance [12, 19] .
As pointed out in Grabisch et al. [11] , the Lovász extension of any pseudoBoolean function f can be expressed as the following min-polynomial
Its degree is that of the multilinear polynomial (1) that expresses f .
Hammer and Holzman [14] investigated the approximation of a pseudo-Boolean function f by a multilinear polynomial of (at most) a specified degree. More precisely, fixing k ∈ N, with k n, they defined the best kth approximation of f as the multilinear polynomial f k : {0, 1} n → R of degree at most k which minimizes
among all multilinear polynomials g of degree at most k. They obtained an explicit form of the solution for k = 1 and k = 2. For a general k, the explicit form of the solution was obtained by Grabisch et al. [11, §7] . It is written as
Hammer and Holzman [14] also noticed that a 1 ({i}) identifies with the classical Banzhaf power index [3] related to the ith player. More generally, Grabisch et al. [11] noticed that, for any S ⊆ N, the coefficient a |S| (S) identifies with the Banzhaf interaction index [22] related to the coalition S.
In this paper we investigate the least squares approximation of a given Lovász extensionf by a min-polynomial of (at most) a specified degree. More precisely, fixing k ∈ N, with k n, we give explicit formulas (see Section 2) for the best kth approximation off , that is, the min-polynomialf k : [0, 1] n → R of degree at most k which minimizes
among all min-polynomialsĝ of degree at most k.
It is important to emphasize that this least squares problem has a relevant application in multicriteria decision making. Indeed, consider a multicriteria decision making problem modelled by a Choquet integral and its underlying capacity on a set of n criteria. It is sometimes useful to approximate this Choquet integral (which is, actually, the Lovász extension of the capacity) by simpler aggregation functions such as Lovász extensions of degree k (k < n). Indeed this subclass of functions includes the Choquet integrals constructed from k-order capacities introduced by Grabisch [9] .
By analogy with the Banzhaf interaction index obtained from the approximations of f , we show (see Section 3) that the approximations off give rise to a new interaction index having appealing properties (see for instance [7] ). Furthermore, it turns out that its corresponding power index identifies with a power index introduced axiomatically by Grabisch and Labreuche [10] .
In order to avoid a heavy notation, cardinalities of subsets S, T, . . . are denoted whenever possible by the corresponding lower case letters s, t, . . ., otherwise by the standard notation |S|, |T |, . . . Also, for any S ⊆ N we define the function
with the convention that min ∅ ≡ 1. Finally, we denote by F N the family of set functions v : 2 N → R.
Approximations of Lovász extensions
We first recall the setting of our approximation problem. For any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we denote by V k the set of all min-polynomialsf k : [0, 1] n → R of degree at most k, i.e., of the formf
Definition 1 Letf ∈ V n and k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The best kth approximation of f is the min-polynomialf k ∈ V k that minimizes
In this section we first discuss existence and uniqueness of the best kth approximation of any functionf ∈ V n (see Proposition 3). Then we provide a closed-form formula for this approximation (see Theorem 9) .
We begin with the following straightforward proposition:
Proposition 2 For any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the set V k is a linear subspace of V n , which in turn is a linear subspace of the space
Moreover, the set
forms a basis of V k and hence dim(
This clearly induces an inner product in V n , which in turn allows to define a norm f :
According to this terminology, the best kth approximation off ∈ V n is the solutionf k of the following least squares problem
which amounts to a classical orthogonal projection problem.
From now on, for any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we denote by A k the orthogonal projector from V n onto V k .
Proposition 3
For anyf ∈ V n and any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the best kth approximation off exists and is uniquely given byf k = A k (f ). In particular, it is characterized as the unique elementf
to each element of the basis B k defined in (4).
This projection problem can be simplified because of the following result, which immediately follows from the fact that the subspaces V k are nested:
We thus observe that A k (f ) can be attained fromf by successively carrying out the projections A n−1 , A n−2 , . . . , A k . We will therefore search for the relation that links any two consecutive projections. This relation will enable us to compute gradually A k (f ) fromf.
Remark 5 Fix k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} and assume thatf k+1 = A k+1 (f) is given. By (5) , A k (f) is the orthogonal projection of A k+1 (f ) onto V k and by Proposition 3, it is given as the unique solutionf k ∈ V k of the following system
To solve this projection problem, we need the following two lemmas. The first one yields an explicit expression of the inner product min S , min T of any two elements of B n . The second lemma, which makes use of the first one, yields an explicit expression of the projections onto V k of the elements of B k+1 \ B k .
Lemma 6
For any S, T ⊆ N, there holds
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Lemma 7 For any S ⊆ N, with s = k + 1, we have
Proof. See Appendix B. 2
Proof. Using formula (5) and then Lemma 7, we obtain
which proves the result. 2
We are now ready to derive the explicit form of the coefficients of A k (f ) in terms of the coefficients off. It is worth comparing this formula with the solution (3) of the Hammer-Holzman approximation problem.
Theorem 9 Let k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The coefficients of A k (f ) are given from those off by
Proof. We only have to prove that the coefficients a k (S) given in (8) fulfill the recurrence relation (7).
Let k ∈ {0, . . . , n} and fix S ⊆ N with s k. By substituting (8) into (7), we obtain, after removing the common term a(S),
Let us show that this equality holds. Dividing through by (−1) k+s and then removing the terms corresponding to a(R), with r = k + 1, the equality becomes a(R).
Fix R ⊇ S, with r > k + 1, and consider the coefficients of a(R) in the previous equality. By equating them, we obtain an identity which can be easily checked. and the best min-quadratic approximation by
Before closing this section, we show that every approximation preserves the symmetry properties of the functions. For instance, in the previous example, we observe that the functionf and all its approximations are symmetric in the variables x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 .
Let us establish this result in a more general setting. Let X be a nonempty closed convex set in a finite-dimensional inner product space V . For any u ∈ V , the distance between u and X is achieved at a unique point in X. We denote this point by A X (u) and call it the projection of u onto X (see for instance [16, Chap. 3 
, §3.1]).
Lemma 11 Let I : V → V be an isometry such that I(X) = X. Then I and
Proof. We clearly have I[A X (u)] ∈ X for any u ∈ V . Furthermore, for any v ∈ X, we have
which shows that I[A X (u)] is the projection of I(u) onto X. 2
Let us now apply this result to our least squares approximation problem.
Definition 12
For any σ in S n , we define the linear operator P σ of V n as
We say that σ ∈ S n is a symmetry off if P σ (f) =f .
Proposition 13
For any σ ∈ S n , the operator P σ is an isometry of V n such that P σ (V k ) = V k . In particular, the operators P σ and A k commute and A k preserves the symmetries of its arguments.
Proof. It is clear that P σ (V k ) = V k and that P σ is an isometry, i.e., it satisfies
Therefore, by Lemma 11, P σ and A k commute. In particular, if σ ∈ S n is a symmetry off , then
and hence σ is also a symmetry of A k (f ). 2
A new interaction index
In cooperative game theory the concept of power index (or value) was introduced in the pioneering work of Shapley [23] . Roughly speaking, a power index on N is a function φ : F N × N → R that assigns to every player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ F N his/her prospect φ(v, i) from playing the game. The Shapley power index of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ F N is given by
Another frequently used power index is the Banzhaf power index [3, 6] which, for a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ F N , is defined by
The concept of interaction index, which is an extension of that of power index, was recently introduced axiomatically to measure the interaction phenomena among players. An interaction index on N is essentially a function I : F N × 2 N → R that assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N of players in a game v ∈ F N its interaction degree. Various interaction indices have been introduced thus far in the literature: the Shapley interaction index [9] , the Banzhaf interaction index [13, 22] , and the chaining interaction index [20] , which all belong to the class of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices (see Definition 14 below) newly axiomatized in [7] .
For instance, the Banzhaf interaction index on N, which extends the concept of Banzhaf power index on N, is the mapping I B : F N × 2 N → R defined by
where ∆ S v(T ) is the S-derivative of v at T defined for any disjoint subsets
This index can be easily expressed in terms of the Möbius transform (2) of v as
It is noteworthy that, besides the axiomatic approach presented in [13, 22] , the Banzhaf interaction index can also be defined from the Hammer-Holzman approximation problem. Indeed, as pointed out in [14] and [11, §7] , by considering the leading coefficients in (3) of the best sth approximation, for all s = 0, . . . , n, we immediately observe that
In this section we use the same approach to define a new interaction index from our approximation problem of Lovász extensions. In this sense this new index can be seen as an analog of the Banzhaf interaction index.
Before going on, we recall the concept of cardinal-probabilistic interaction index [7] .
Definition 14 A cardinal-probabilistic interaction index on N is a mapping
N → R such that, for any S ⊆ N, there is a family of nonnegative real numbers {p s t (n)} t=0,...,n−s satisfying n−s t=0 p s t (n) = 1, such that
It has been proved [7, §4] that a mapping I p : F N × 2 N → R of the form (10) is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index on N if and only if, for any integer s ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there exists a uniquely determined cumulative distribution function F s on [0, 1] such that
Moreover, defining q s t := p s t−s (t) = 1 0 x t−s dF s (x) for all integers s, t such that 0 s t n, we have
The following lemma provides conditions on arbitrary coefficients q s t so that a mapping of the form (12) can be a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index. 
Lemma 15 Consider an infinite sequence {q
Moreover, when these conditions are satisfied, then the mapping (12) , is of the form (10) and the coefficients q 
Proof. (ii) ⇒ (iii) Rewriting (12) in terms of v gives
Partitioning L ⊆ J into R ⊆ S and T ⊆ J \ S and then using (9), we obtain
where the coefficients p s t (n) are given by
which shows that I p is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index.
(iii) ⇒ (ii) According to formula (12), we have
which completes the proof by uniqueness of this decomposition. 2
We are now ready to introduce our new interaction index, namely the mapping
where a s (S) are the leading coefficients in (8) of the best sth approximation off , for all s = 0, . . . , n.
This immediately leads to the following equivalent definition, which makes use of the classical beta function
Definition 16
For any N = {1, . . . , n}, we define the mapping
where q
for all t s 0.
By using Lemma 15, we can easily show that I M is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index. .
Proposition 17 The function I
Proof. We immediately observe that Lemma 15 applies with the beta distribution
.
Indeed, we have
The expression of the coefficients p s t (n) then follows immediately from (11) . 2 The following proposition shows that the mapping v → (I M (v, S)) S⊆N is invertible and yields the transformation formula from (I M (v, S)) S⊆N to a = (a(S)) S⊆N .
Proposition 18 For any S ⊆ N, we have
Proof. We only need to show that
We have
where the inner sum equals 1 if S = R and 0 if S R. Indeed, in the latter case, we have 
Corollary 19
The restriction of I M (v, ·) to singletons is given by:
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 6
Observe first that we can assume that S and T are such that |S ∪ T | = n. Moreover, suppose that S and T are nonempty. Remark that [0, 1] n is equal almost everywhere to the disjoint union of the sets
Then we have
where
Now, define for every R ⊆ N and p ∈ {1, . . . , |R|} the set
It is then clear that there is a decomposition of S n into disjoint subsets
where S n (S ∩ T ) := {σ ∈ S n | σ(1) ∈ S ∩ T }.
Moreover we have Indeed, every element of S n (S ∩ T ) corresponds to a choice of σ(1) in S ∩ T , and a permutation of the remaining elements in N. In the same fashion, every element of S (p) n (S \ T ) is determined by the choice of p elements in S \ T , a permutation of these elements, the choice of a single element in T and a permutation of the remaining elements. Moreover, for any σ ∈ S n (S ∩ T ), we have I σ = 2 |S ∩ T | (n − 1)! (n + 2)! = 2 (s + t − n) n(n + 1)(n + 2) .
In the same way, for any σ ∈ S I σ = (n − t)(n + 2t + 2) n(n + 1)(n + 2)(t + 1)
Similarly, we can write n−s p=1 σ∈S I σ = (n − s)(n + 2s + 2) n(n + 1)(n + 2)(s + 1) (17) and by Eqs. (13)- (17), we have 
